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PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND THE
LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the con-
cept of "due process of law" as embodied in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. Its applicability to a given case is
dependent upon the involvement of either the "liberty" or "property"
of the person seeking to invoke its protection. The specific nature of
an interest which will be termed liberty or property has not, however,
always been clear. In a series of recent decisions,1 the United States
Supreme Court has adopted an analysis which places greater emphasis
upon the specific nature of the interest affected as either liberty or
property. The outcome of this approach may be to increase the im-
portance of a litigant's ability to characterize his endangered interests
as within the liberty or property concepts.
Two cases, Board of Regents v. Roth2 and Perry v. Sindermann,3
highlight both the problem and the analytical framework adopted
by the Court in dealing with it. They involve an area that has recently
been much litigated.4 Roth and Perry both concern teachers at public
institutions (Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh and Odessa Junior
College of Texas, respectively) whose expired contracts were not
renewed. Both cases raised the issue of whether the teachers had a
procedural right under the fourteenth amendment to a statement of
the reasons for non-renewal and an opportunity for a hearing. The
Court's opinions in Perry and Roth deal explicitly with the issue in
terms of whether the teachers' interests in having their contract re-
newed came within the protected liberty or property concepts. While
the teachers' allegations and arguments raised questions which could
more properly be placed under the concept of liberties, the Court
chose to treat the interests primarily as property rights. The factual
distinction between denial of procedural due process in Roth and the
Court's granting it in Perry did not turn upon allegations of deprivation
of specific Bill of Rights guarantees or of the right to pursue an
1 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Drown v. Ports-
mouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430
F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); Pred v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1969); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969); Freeman v. Gould
Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969); Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
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occupation; rather its basis was the degree of certainty that employ-
ment by the specific school would be continued, or, as the Court stated
in Roth, whether the teacher's interest in contract renewal was founded
on "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."5 By so framing the issue,
the Court has provided an analysis which should be determinative of
a number of future cases in the area of public employment.
We must begin with some discussion of two closely related
situations: those in which the discontinuation of employment operates
to infringe upon specifically protected collateral rights, and those in
which it forecloses an individual's future employment opportunities.
It was in litigating these issues that the present theories evolved.
Effective Deprivation of Related Interests
There is a violation of due process if the termination or non-renewal
of a public employee's contract is based on the employee's exercise of
rights specifically protected by the Bill of Bights." These civil liberties,
or collateral rights, are ensured by due process as liberties within the
fourteenth and fifth amendments.7 The free exercise of these civil
liberties is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights against infringement
by the federal government, and through incorporation in the fourteenth
amendment against infringement by a state.8 Therefore, any state or
federal action-including a decision not to renew an employment con-
tract-which infringes upon, deters, or punishes the exercise of any of
these rights is a deprivation of a liberty interest within the contem-
plation of the amendments. 9 Since the interest which invokes due
process is the specific constitutional liberty of which one has been
5 408 U.S. at 577.
' See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (freedom of
speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (freedom of worship); Torcaso
v. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (freedom of worship); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956); (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (freedoms of association and speech).
7 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960); Pred v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969).
8 But see Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HxAv. L. REv. 518
(1970), in which it is argued that in the area of first amendment freedoms,
procedural safeguards are generated by the first rather than the fifth or fourteenth
amendments.
9 This is often stated as the theory of "unconstitutional conditions." The
government cannot do indirectly (deprive one of his constitutional rights by mak-
ing his employment conditional upon his surrender of them) what it cannot do
directly (pass a law infringing upon Bill of Bights freedoms). Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1966); Sherbert v. Verer 374 U.S. 398, 404-06
(1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 526 (1958). For a more detailed
explanation of this rationale see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction In ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-58 (1968).
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deprived, then the individual's employment status-tenured or non-
tenured, contractual or "at wiUl"-is not relevant' l0 Shelton v. Tucker,'1
involving the non-renewal of teachers' contracts where the teachers
had no tenure and no job security beyond the end of each school year,
illustrates this last point.'2 The teachers in that case had refused to
fie statutorily required affidavits listing all the organizations to which
they bad belonged or contributed during the preceding five years.
They alleged that the statute deprived them of the liberty of freedom
of association by its requirement that they reveal every "associational
tie." The Court held that non-renewal of their contracts for failure to
file the affidavits was a violation of due process.' 3
The protections of due process attach once such liberties have
been implicated.14 These protections particularly include placing on
the government the burden of proving that the activities engaged in
are not protected,15 and requiring that any encroachment upon con-
stitutionally protected liberties be justified by a connection with some-
thing that is within the state's police powers to regulate.' 6 Exactly
what is required on the part of the employee to implicate them is
unclear.
17
United Public Workers v. Mitchell,'3 upholding the Hatch Act
against charges of infringement upon the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of public employees, provides an example of the substantive
protection of due process in this area. The Court upheld the Act's
constitutionality saying that the regulated activities (active participa-
tion in partisan politics) were "reasonably deemed by Congress to
interfere with the efficiency of the public service." 9 The courts thus
10 Pred v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969); Free-
man v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1158-60 (8th Cir. 1969).
11364 U.S. 479 (1960).
12 Id. at 486.
13 Id. at 485-86.
14 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21, 524 (1958).
5Id. at 525-26; Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59
(1956).
1' Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451-52 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923).
17 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1972); Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F. Supp. 545, 547
(E.D. Ky. 1971); -f. Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 134-35 (6th Cir. 1971); Jones
v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1969). See also Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899-901 (1961) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
18330 U.S. 75 (1947). This case may very soon be overturned. A three-
judge United States District Court panel has held the Hatch Act unconstitutional
as vague and overly broad in a decision now awaiting final resolution in the
Supreme Court. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578 (1972), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972) (No.
634).
19 United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947). For some
(Continued on next page)
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could be concerned only "when such regulation passes beyond the
general existing conception of government power."20 This language
is characteristic also of a number of decisions concerning state action
against public employees. 21 Therefore, due process, once attached to
the interest at stake, affords two protections: first, that one not be
deprived of constitutional liberties without procedural safeguards
(meaning notice and opportunity for a hearing), and second, that any
encroachment upon such collateral rights be justified as protection of
a valid state interest.
The protections of due process will also attach where the individual
can show that the governmental action has, either directly or indirectly,
foreclosed his opportunity to pursue an occupation. Whether this
opportunity is better designated as a "liberty"22 or as "property,"2 3 its
foreclosure by governmental action is a deprivation within the mean-
ing of the due process clause.2 4 This deprivation may be effected
directly by the denial of a license to practice some profession 5 or
skill,20 or indirectly by some action foreclosing one's chance to obtain
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
possible ramification of this see Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Free-
dom; 81 H nv. L. REv. 1045, 1083 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Academic Freedom],
observing that the governmental interest in security, which justified the restriction
on political activities in Mitchell, is not as significant in cases involving public school
teachers.
20 United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947); cf. Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
21 See, e.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559-67 (1956)
(Reed & Harlan, JJ., dissenting); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451-52
1954); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 485, 494-96 (1952); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923). The present viability of the reasonableness justifica-
tion is in great doubt, however. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1968), in which the Court said that only a compelling state interest can justify
infringement upon a specifically protected constitutional right (freedom to travel
among the states). Cf. Keyisbian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1966).
For further development of the discussion compare Mr. Justice Blackmun's re-
marks on the subject in the majority opinion of Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728-32
(1973), with Mr. Justice Rehnquist's comments in dissent, Id. at 736-37.
22 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Truax v. Raich 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Parker
v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 717 (9th Cir. 1955). See aLo Academic Freedom, supra
note 19, at 1080-81.
23 See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889).24 See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957); Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1916); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22
(1889); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Parker v.
Lester, 227 F.2d 708 716-17 (9th Cir. 1955). But see Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 493 (19585. Compare Greene, at 492 with Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
25 See e.g. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (denial of
attorney'sicense); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (suspension ofphysician's license); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (denial of




future jobs with private or public employers.27 This often occurs as
the result of governmental action terminating or failing to renew em-
ployment because of disloyalty, untrustworthiness, or some other
grounds harmful to reputation.28 How total the foreclosure need be
to invoke the full due process protections of notice and opportunity
for a hearing is still unsettled. 29 Loss of all opportunity to follow a
specific vocation will afford the full protections.s0 The Court has
stated, however, that when one has been denied only "the opportunity
to work at one isolated and specific military installation," due process
will not apply.31 It is unresolved whether a governmental action
which precludes the individual from ever again working in any
capacity for the same private employer will be a deprivation sufficient
to require a full hearing.32 Where there is an effective deprivation of
future employment opportunities through charges of disloyalty, dis-
honesty, or moral fitness, such charges will have to have been made
fairly explicit through governmental action. Mere removal of a security
clearance will not in most cases be sufficient for full protection since
such an action might not necessarily have been motivated on grounds
constituting a "badge of infamy."33  (Notice that the issue of fore-
closure of future employment is treated separately from the deprivation
of a possibly protected interest in the employment directly affected
by the termination or non-renewal, which was the specific issue in
Roth and Perry.) The initial burden of showing that he stands to lose
an interest within the ambit of the due process is again on the em-
ployee,34 once due process has been invoked, its protection is dual-
both substantive and procedural.35
27 See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1916); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d
708 (9th Cir. 1955).
28 See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 901-02 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 475-76, 491 n.21, 492 (1958); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
190-91; Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
29 Compare Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961), with Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 716 (9th Cir.
1955).
30 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 25 and 26.
31 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895-96 (1961).32 See Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745, 747 n.2 (7th Cir. 1970); Homer v.
Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In the latter case the test was stated
as being whether the governmental action "significantly curtailed their ability to
follow an employment in which they had previously engaged." Id. at 722.
33 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
898-99 (1961). Mr. Justice Brennan, in dissent, disagreed strongly with this con-
clusion. Id. at 901-02.
34Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972); cf. Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420, 443 (1960).
M5 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25.
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Non-continuation of Present Employment
The belief that due process protections might extend to the em-
ployment interest directly affected by governmental action was de-
rived from the theories and cases above. The decisions involving
specific civil liberties and those involving professional licenses required
due process safeguards in order to insure the individual against
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable governmental action.3 6 Might
this protection against such deprivations not extend to all cases in
which the individual will lose a substantial private interest, such as
his continued employment in a public job?
Governmental employment was originally defined as a "mere
privilege."37 Since there was no claim of right to the job, there was
no interest which could invoke due process protections. For our
purposes, there was no property interest in continuation of the em-
ployment.38 The flaw in this theory of a government's total dis-
cretionary control over the privileges which it dispenses was that the
discretion was soon shown not to be total in the civil liberties and
professional licensing cases. 39 That this privilege theory of public
employment has been undermined in those cases became evident in
two decisions rendered in 1951.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath" involved three
organizations seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Attorney General of the United States for alleged deprivations caused
by his designating them as "communist" on a list submitted to the
Loyalty Review Board 4' which dismissed federal employees who be-
longed to the organizations. None of the employees were joined as
plaintiffs. The deprivations alleged by the organizations were loss of
moral support, good will, contributions, and membership attributed to
the wide dissemination of the list. The Court voted five to three to
remand with instructions that the motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim be overruled, but the decision rested on the narrow ground
30 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6, 25, and 26.
37 Justice Holmes, while sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, once
uttered this famous epigram which is very often cited in decisions utilizing the
privilege theory of public employment: "The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
McAuliffe v. Mayor & Council, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). For a contemporary
view of this epigram see Van Alstyne, s-upra note 9, at 1442-43, 1458-64.3 8 See 2 T. CooLEY, CONsTrrIONAL LMrrATioNs 746 n.1 (8th ed. 1927).
39 For an exhaustive study of the various methods used to circumvent the
privilege theory, see Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1445-58.
40 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
4 function of this Board was, quite simply, to weed "subversives" out
of the Civil Service. It had been created and its powers defined by Exec. Order
No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 129 (Supp. 1947).
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that the Attorney General's designation of those organizations without
their having had the opportunity for a hearing was not an authorized
procedure.42 Four members of the Court filed opinions indicating
their belief that the losses alleged by the organizations were de-
privations of interests protected by the fifth amendment due process
clause.43 Mr. Justice Frankfurter enunciated the standard that whether
one would be "condemned to suffer grievous loss" by the governmental
action must be considered. 44 Mr. Justice Reed, writing in dissent, felt
not only that the Attorney General's procedure had been authorized,
but also that there had not been a deprivation of either a liberty or
property interest within the meaning of the fifth amendment.45 The
Attorney General's action, he said, did "not prohibit any business of
the organization."46 He also drew a parallel between any interests
which might have been deprived and the taking of private property
through eminent domain4 7 (which does not require the opportunity
for a hearing4"). The decision, then, revealed some disagreement
among the members of the Court as to the range of interests protected
by due process.
It was, however, the second of the two cases that became significant
as precedent for denying due process protection to an individual's
interest in continued public employment. In Bailey v. Richardson,4 9
the court divided four to four, Mr. Justice Clark not participating, on
the protected interest issue. Bailey involved a civil service employee
who had been dismissed without notice or hearing from her job upon
"reasonable grounds ... for belief that the person involved is disloyal
to the Government of the United States."50 The circuit decision, which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court's division, categorically denied
that the employment interest was one either of contract, or of liberty
or property under the fifth amendment.51 Citing cases and "a hundred
and sixty years of Government administration," the opinion maintained
that a public employee serves at the will of his governmental em-
ployer. 5 2 There was, therefore, no due process protection since "[d]ue
42 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 135-42 (1951).
43 id. at 142-87.
44 Id. at 168 (Fankfurter, J., concurring).
45 Id. at 187-213.
46 Id. at 202.
47 Id. at 203.48 Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 401 (1923).
49 341 U.S. 918 (1951), affg by an equally divided Court, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C.
Cir. 1950).50 182 F.2d 46, 51 (1950).
51 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see T. Coo=-xy,
supra note 38, at 746 n.1.
52 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
[Vol. 61
COMMNT~S
process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of some-
thing to which he has a right."5
3
The language of this court of appeals opinion provided strong
support for those who denied the applicability of due process in the
areas of public employment and governmental largess in general. But
the limits of the privilege theory, which should have been evident
from a close reading of such cases as Ex parte Garland54 and United
Public Workers v. Mitchell,5 5 were clarified in Wieman v. Updegraff,56
Barsky v. Board of Regents,57 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educa-
tion,5" Greene v. McElroy,59 and Shelton v. Tucker.0
To draw . . .the facile generalization that there is no constitu-
tionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the is-
sue.... We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to
public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion...
is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. 61
Wieman and Slochower involved teachers under contract and
tenure, respectively, who were summarily dismissed pursuant to state
statutory requirements. Both cases concerned specific Bill of Rights
liberties as well as contractual and tenurial interests.6 The Court
found both dismissals violative of due process since no procedures
had been provided for establishing that the actions punished by the
dismissals were not protected.6 3 Barsky held valid a six-month suspen-
sion of a physician's license after finding that both the procedures
adjudicating the suspension and the connection of the specific reasons
for suspension with a valid state interest met due process require-
ments.64 Greene concerned the removal, without a full-trial-type
53 Id. at 58.
5471 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
55 33 U.S. 75 (1947).
66344 U.S. 183 (1952)
57347 U.S. 442 (1954).
58 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
59360 U.S. 474 (1959).
60364 U.S. 479 (1960).
61Wieman v. Updegra, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).6 2 Wieraan involved first amendment freedoms of association and speech;
Slocower involved the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
03 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Slochower v. Bd. of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956). Note, however, that the opinon in
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), placed more emphasis on gese two
cases as giving protection to the employment interests (contractual and tenurial)
involved. One writer feels that the effect of these two cases was to implicitly over-
rule those parts of the Bailey case that held public employment to be a mere"privilege." See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HAirv. L.
Ezv. 193, 234 (1956).64 fBarsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). For a somewhat different
interpretation of the significance of Barsly, see Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1444.
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hearing, of a security clearance from a privately-employed areo-
nautical engineer, the practical effect of which was to close the field
of aeronautics to him.65 The holding there, similar to that of McGrath,66
was on the narrow grounds of non-authorization,67 but Chief Justice
Warren gave strong indication that the indirect foreclosure of Greene's
ability to work in his professional field would require a full hearing.68
Finally, the Shelton case6 9 unequivocally showed the inapplicability
of the privilege concept, even for mere non-renewal of a non-tenured
teacher's contract, where the effect of that non-renewal was "impair-
ment of a constitutional liberty."7
0
The first case since Bailey to consider directly the issue of whether
or not an interest solely in continued employment is entitled to due
process protections was decided by the Supreme Court in 1961. Cafe-
teria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy71 arose out
of facts somewhat similar to those of Greene. The employee, Rachel
Brawner, had been working for a private concessionaire operating on
the premises of a United States Naval Gun Factory. Admittance to
the installation required a badge, the issuance of which depended
upon approval by the factory security officer. This condition appeared
in Brawner's contract with the concessionaire.72 The security officer
revoked her badge for failing to meet the security requirements he
had determined. After she requested and was denied a hearing by
factory officials, Local 473 of the Union brought suit to have the badge
returned. There was no allegation of infringement with collateral
rights, and the Court pointed out that Brawner was free to take the
same job with the same employer, or for that matter, any job with any
employer-nothing was at stake beyond "the opportunity to work at
one isolated and specific military installation."73 The Court did not
find any badge of infamy as the result of removal of the security clear-
ance which would operate to impair her future employment oppor-
tunities.74 Nor was it possible to dispose of the case on the narrow
grounds of non-authorization used in McGrath and Greene, for here
the governmental action was based upon a commanding officer's his-
torically unquestioned power to exclude civilians from the areas of
65 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 475-76, 491 n.21, 492 (1959).
6 6 joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
67 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959).
68 Id. at 492.
69 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
70 Id. at 485-87. As discussed previously, that case involved freedom of as-
sociation.
71367 U.S. 886 (1961).
72 Id. at 887.
73 Id. at 895-96.
74 Id. at 898-99.
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his command. 75 In a five to four decision, the Court conceded that
some private interest had been impaired,76 and that this interest was
substantial enough that the removal of the badge could not be "patently
arbitrary or discriminatory."77 But such was not the case here, for the
reason advanced for removal of Brawner's security clearance-her fail-
ure to meet the requirements-was "entirely rational and in accord
with the contract."78 To determine exactly what, if any, procedures
were required in this situation, the Court balanced Brawner's interest
in her opportunity to work at that one specific installation (noting
that such an employment interest might be characterized as a mere
privilege) against the Government's proprietary control of the factory,
and found that her summary exclusion was permissible.79
Both of the lower court opinions in the Roth litigation placed too
much emphasis upon this "balancing test," concluding that Roth's
interest outweighed that of the Board of Regents,80 and ordering the
Board to provide him with notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
What the district and circuit courts in Roth failed to discern was that
the Supreme Court in Cafeteria Workers had conceded that due process
applied to protect Brawner's interest in keeping her badge. This must
be deduced from the facts in light of the Roth analysis; in addition, it
should be noted that Mr. justice Stewart wrote both the Cafeteria
Workers and Roth opinions. Given, therefore, that her interest could
not be impaired without due process protections-that it could not be
unreasonably, unlawfully, or discriminatorily impaired-the issue be-
came whether those protections included notice and hearing.8' It was
in this context that the government's "historically plenary power" over
such a job and its proprietary interest in the gun factory combined to




78 Id. thus distinguishing Wieman and United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947).79 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 894-97 (1961).
80 Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1971); 310 F. Supp.
972, 977-80 (W.D. Wis. 1970). Other courts have made the same mistake. See,
e.g., Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100
(7th Cir. 1970).
81 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 n.8 (1972); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1972); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440
(1960).
82 See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) (holding an ex parte
proceeding sufficient to meet due process requirements when the governmental
action was only a fact-finding investigation not adjudicating any rights); Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855)
(upholding an ex parte proceeding for issuance of a distress warrant by the
solicitor of the Treasury).
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theless, by failure to give more explicit treatment to the threshold
question of whether due process applied at all, the Court left the door
open for the varying analyses employed by the lower courts. 3
By the time Roth and Perry were decided, several decisions indi-
cated the theoretical basis for the distinction drawn in Roth and Perry
to determine the applicability of due process. The theory itself was
not new, being derived from concepts of "vested" property rights and
implied contracts. What was novel was the application of the "vesting"
concept to an area that had previously been analyzed solely in terms
of the privilege theory. Prior to Roth and Perry it had been argued
that the nature of public employment-as purely a privilege-logically
precluded any claim by the beneficiary that he might be entitled to it.
This idea of entitlement had been forecast in a few decisions regarding
interests that were previously thought of as privileges. Goldsmith t.
Board of Tax Appeals,84 cited in Roth, attached procedural due process
safeguards, including a hearing, to an accountant's application for
admission to practice before the Board, reasoning that this protection
arose from the accountant's having met the announced standards for
qualification. Hahn v. Burke85 required a hearing prior to a state's
revocation of probation. "Vhen the state created conditions of pro-
bation it impliedly agreed to continue petitioner's probation as long
as the conditions were satisfied."86 Goldberg v. Kelly87 required notice
and a pre-termination hearing in a case of deprivation of welfare bene-
fits. Expressly rejecting the privilege-right distinction,8 8 the Goldberg
Court spoke in terms of "statutory entitlements," saying that these were
more like "property" than "gratuities."8 9 Bell v. Burson9 ° most clearly
illustrated this vesting approach. Bell held violative of fourteenth
amendment procedural protections a Georgia statute providing for
automatic suspension of the driver's license and vehicle registration
of any uninsured motorist involved in an accident. The due process
protections of pre-suspension notice and hearing to determine the
"reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him"
83 See, e.g., the teaching cases cited supra note 4.
84270 U.S. 117 (1926).
85430 F.2d 100 (7th Gir. 1970). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972),
upheld the ri otf aarolee to a hearing before revocation, saying:
It is harly usefu any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms
of whether the parolee's liberty is a "niht" or a "privilege." By whatever
name the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 482.
86 Hahn v. Burke 430 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970).
87 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
88 Id. at 262.
89 Id. at 262 n.8.
90 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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followed from the implication of the motorist's interest in having
transportation to and from work, which he had acquired upon issuance
of the license. The statute would have withstood challenge had it
barred issuance of the license, but
once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that ad-
judicates important interests of the licensees. 9'
A few of the pre-Roth circuit opinions had even applied this type of
approach to non-renewal cases in the teaching area.92 The Supreme
Court had attached due process protections in Connell v. Higgin-
botuam93 to a substitute teacher summarily dismissed only two months
after being hired, where there had been neither tenure nor a formal
contract but only a clear implication of continued employment.
As enunciated in Roth, the measure of what constitutes a protected
property interest requires
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it....
Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.9
4
Thus, absent any showing of infringement upon a separate liberty,
such as freedom of speech or the right to pursue his vocation,95 Mr.
Roth was not protected by due process. His employment was secured
by neither tenure nor any "existing rules or understandings"-he was
simply not being employed for the next year.96 Perry's interest, on
91 Id. at 539.92 Orr v. Triater, 444 F.2d 128, 130 (6th Gir. 1971); Ferguson v. Thomas,
430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1329 (10th
Cir. 1969); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1158-60 (8th
Cir. 1969).
93 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
94d of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Note the similarity of
this language to that used in T. CooLEY, supra note 38, at 749.
[I]t would seem that a right cannot be considered a vested right, unless
it is something more than a mere expectation as may be based upon an
anticipated continuance of the present general laws: it must have become
a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a de-
mand, or a legal exemption from a demand made by another.
The first edition of that work appeared in 1868-the year in which the
fourteenth amendment was adopted.
95 Id. at 579.
96 Id. at 578.
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the other hand, might have been secured by a de facto tenure system
under which his dismissal could only be effected upon showing of
cause.97 The Perry opinion was based upon analogous concepts
drawn from contract and labor relations law.98 The Court remanded
Perry for a hearing to determine whether he had in fact been under
such a system.
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Roth reasoned that government,
unlike private enterprise, is always obliged to act reasonably in the
conduct of its business. Hence, the citizen seeking public employment"is entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason for
denying the employment." This, he felt, is a property right within the
meaning of the due process clauses.99
Conclusions
The full theoretical ramifications of the entitlement, or "vested
right," idea in the area of governmental largess is as yet highly con-
jectural. As has been pointed out, this concept was derived from
traditional property law and implied contract theories. It could be,
then, that this conceptualization simply makes explicit an analysis that
has in fact, if not in language, been utilized all along. On the other
hand, it may be significant that this approach was not articulated in
public employment cases until after its use in the area of welfare
benefits. 100 If it represents a shift in judicial philosophy with respect
to governmental largess generally, then it may well signal the initiation
of further inroads into the privilege concept. Certainly there is much
room for development where governmentally controlled benefits are
involved,' 0 ' for the theoretical aspects of this conceptualization are
applicable wherever there is a property interest involved. The theory
is concerned with the boundaries of control over the property interest.
At what point does the donee's claim become so secured that the donor
loses his power to revoke the gift without giving a reasonable explana-
tion, or to condition it upon the donee's compliance with certain
specifications? That is, at what point, and under what circumstances,
97 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
98 Id. at 601-02, citing 3 A. CORBIN, CoRn ON CoNRAAcrs §§ 561-672A
(1960) for the contractual analogy, and United Steelworkers of America v. War-
rior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960), for the labor analogy.
99 408 U.S. at 588 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1968).
101 For a thorough treatment of all aspects of this new approach to the field




does the security of the donees claim become strong enough to obtain
the protections of due process?
In any case, the explicit conditioning of due process protections
on the litigant's ability to characterize an interest as specifically'one of
liberty or property may well have some noticeable effects. If he cannot
establish either a showing of entitlement to the employment or fore-
closure of future employment opportunities, he will have to carry the
burden of showing that the deprivation of his employment was moti
vated by his exercise of constitutionally protected rights. The pos-
sibility is then quite real that these rights could be infringed upon by
simple failure of the governmental body to give any reasons at all for
its action when, in reality, such action was motivated by the individuals
exercise of these protected rights. This particular criticism of the
Court's approach is perhaps the most substantial. 10 2
The relative strictness of Roth's classification of interests might also
be subjected to criticism. The great utility of the due process concept
has been its ability to adjust the protections afforded to the nature of
any given case.'0 3 Might there not conceivably be an instance in
which an individual is "condemned to suffer grevious loss," but in
which the loss cannot successfully be characterized as either a liberty
or a property interest? On the other hand, might there not be cases
involving relatively trivial interests which nevertheless clearly meet
the outlined standards of entitlement? At least one writer has suggested
that the protections should be made expressly dependent on the
importance, perhaps even subjective, of the interest to the person
derived.1 0 4 There is also the difficulty in applying an abstract con-
ceptualization such as entitlement to actual facts as they arise in
litigation.'0 5 The entitlement concept is unquestionably open to much
102 See 408 U.S. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 899-901 (1961) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1453. See also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 446
F.2d 806, 810-12, 814 (1971) (Duffy, J., dissenting); Drown v. Portsmouth
School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1185-88 (1st Cir. 1970), discussing the effects of
placing an absolute requirement of procedural due process on the school boards in
this situation. Note also that the American Association of University Professors has
endorsed the giving of a statement or reasons and an opportunity for a hearing
vhen requested by a teacher whose contract is not renewed. Report of Committee
A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Procedural Standards in the Renewal or
Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 21, 22-24 (1970).
103 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899-901 (1961)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950); T. CooLEY, supra note 38, at 741.
104 Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1462-64.
105 For a discussion of some questions not yet answered in the teaching field
see Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured, 58 A.A.U.P. BuLrL.
267 (1972).
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development in situations involving any kind of probationary employ-
ment status. What, for example, is the full significance of rules and
standards of conduct of which the employee is notified at the begin-
ning of his employment? All of these are problems that must of course
be resolved through litigation.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the standards set forth in Roth
and Perry are generally satisfactory. The entitlement criterion is
fundamentally an objective one, its logic is sound, and its mechanics
are somewhat familiar in the forms of vested rights and implied con-
tracts. Given its applicability, the extent of the protections afforded
is still very adaptable to the range of competing interests involved.
Furthermore, the Roth analysis leaves room for operation of the
privilege theory with regard to some interests. Application of that
theory would seem to be desirable in matters such as pardons of con-
victed prisoners, or Presidential dismissals of cabinet officers.'16 It
might, therefore, be unwise at this time to apply the entitlement con-
cept as far as it has been carried by Mr. Justice Marshall, who would
have it attach upon application for a government job.JO As in all
matters of constitutional law, time will tell.
Mark L. Moseley
106 Davis, supra note 63, at 224.
107 408 U.S. at 588 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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